Technical Tools:

Incentives: How they Function

Dec 8, 2016 — Neil Boyle

  “The problem with practitioners and researchers is that practitioners practice but don’t read, and researchers read but don’t practice” (John Briscoe, former head of the central Urban and Water unit of the World Bank, 2014) The incentives of PPP infrastructure projects start within the transaction— in the economic exchange that occurs ...

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Summary of Thoughts on Reforming the UN

Aug 4, 2015 — Neil Boyle

This paper suggests a “new technology” could be applied to reform the UN by paying attention to the incentives that make transactions work as planned.  It follows on General Scowcroft’s description during the 2013 Atlantic Council conference Getting to Fusion: A Conversation with Strategists, “how the Arab uprisings demonstrated that ...

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Large Metro WSS Infrastructure & Major Hurdles: an Extractive Political Economy, Scaling-up, and Financial Unsustainability in Karachi Sewage as Case Study, Pakistan

Mar 16, 2015 — Neil Boyle

Large Metro WSS Infrastructure Major Hurdles-Political Economy Scaling Up and Financial Unsustainability AAA-AA 2182015

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Economizing on Transaction Costs: Bounded Rationality and Opportunism

Jan 12, 2015 — Neil Boyle

The integrity of economic exchange is decided within the transaction. Transaction costs deriving from the bounded rationality and opportunism of contracting parties diminish the integrity of contracts. By economizing on these costs, contract integrity and efficiency are restored through economic governance. While integrity refers to a contractual relationship between two ...

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TCE & Scaling-Up Infrastructure: A Pakistan Sewage Treatment Plant

Apr 3, 2014 — Neil Boyle

PART ONE: Background Summary This three part workshop précis examines the application and use of institutional analysis in the preparation and implementation of large scaled-up infrastructure and as case study concentrates on the development of a new sewage treatment plant for the metropolitan area of Karachi, Pakistan by the Karachi Water Supply ...

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Private Ordering and Cognitive Psychology

Jan 13, 2014 — Neil Boyle

Studies in cognitive psychology support the development of credible commitment and private ordering in three respects: (i) that people’s responses to risky situations depend directly on emotional influences such as worry, dread, or anxiety, responses of the primitive part of the brain rather than the cortex [1] (Shiller, 2003, p. ...

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Economic Governance Made Intelligible

Jan 10, 2014 — Neil Boyle

Economic governance was made intelligible when Williamson postulated (1975) that markets and firms are distinct governance structures of transactions where governance costs vary with the asset specificity of the exchange asset. The asset specificity of transaction-specific assets carries critical information concerning the incentives of the asset owners. It gives rise ...

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UPDATED – Assessments of SOE Water Projects in Low Income Countries PART – I

Sep 5, 2010 — Neil Boyle

Assessments of SOE Water Projects in Low Income Countries 9-2-2010 PART - I Having worked on SOE water projects in Brazil, India, Pakistan, Cambodia and the Philippines, it strikes me that we tend to look carefully at projects that are successful, but frequently give less than in-depth scrutiny to the projects ...

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UPDATED – Putting PPP Government Bureaucratic Problems into an Analytical Framework – PART – IIa

Aug 28, 2010 — Neil Boyle

In Part–IIa, we discuss the game changing government bureaucratic problems that arise in the development and tendering of BOT PPP projects. INFRAGOV associates in Manila, Dr. Ramon Clarete and Mr. Hector Florento brought bureaucracy problems to my attention. Both are working to resolve bureaucracy problems in their country and continue ...

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Updated – Tougher yet Flexible Implementation and the 32 Year Old Coal Supply Contract- PART – II

Aug 27, 2010 — Neil Boyle

1.     Tougher implementation also means tougher and more open negotiations. Tougher negotiations mean smarter trade-offs are made between the negotiations triple of price (higher or lower), technology (from generic to specialized), and contractual safeguards (less rigid and not reformative to more rigid and reformative). Smart trade-offs induce credible commitment between two parties. For ...

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Jul 19, 2010 — Neil Boyle

UPDATED - TCE PRECEPTS FOR ANALYZING INSTITUTIONS 07-19-2010 ver 3C Please click on the above link to see the updated version of what I consider one of my important posts.  It is important because it concentrates in one file the beginning of what I have learned over the past 10 years of studying ...

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